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Whether optimization techniques or expert systems technologies are used, 
the underlying inference processes and the model or knowledge base for a 
computerized problem-solving system are likely to be incomplete for any given 
complex, real-world task. To deal with the resultant brittleness, it has been 
suggested that "cooperative" rather than "automated' problem-solving systems be 
designed. Such cooperative systems are proposed to explicitly enhance the 
collaboration of people and the computer system when working in partnership to 
solve problems. 
This study evaluates the impact of alternative design concepts on the 
performance of airline pilots interacting with such a cooperative system designed 
to support enroute flight planning. Thirty pilots were studied using three 
different versions of the system. The results clearly demonstrate that different 
system design concepts can strongly influence the cognitive processes of users. 
Indeed, one of the designs studied caused four times as many pilots to accept a 
poor flight amendment. Based on think-aloud protocols, cognitive models are 
proposed to account for how features of the computer system interacted with 
specific types of scenarios to influence exploration and decision-making by the 
pilots. The results are then used to develop recommendations for guiding the ' 
design of cooperative systems. 
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In this study, three alternative designs for a cooperative problem-solving system 
(Robertson, Zachery and Black, 1990) were empirically evaluated. All three 
designs provided support for the task of enroute planning for commercial aviation 
flights. They differed in terms of the timing and degree of assistance provided by 
the computer. 
The goals of the study were three-fold: 
1. To gain a better understanding of how people perform adaptive 
planning tasks; 
To increase our understanding of how alternative system 
designs influence the cognitive processes of users during such 
planning tasks; 
To develop recommendations to guide in the design of advanced 
tools to support pilots and dispatchers in their flight planning 
activities. 
2. 
3. 
Enroute flight planning involves the modification of the flight plan of an airborne 
aircraft in response to problems with weather, air traffic, medical emergencies, 
mechanical failures, etc. The flight crew, air traffic controllers and airline 
company dispatchers all play important roles in this planning process. 
Figure 1 shows the relationships between the various components of the 
planning environment, with the flight plan as the central unifying element of the 
components. The flight plan stipulates what altitude and heading the plane will 
fly during various phases of the flight and what routes the plane will take. The 
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route in turn determines he weather that will be encountered along the way. 
Similarly, the weather &ects the spedd, safety, and efficiency of the plane, as well 
as passenger comfort. The capabilities of the plane partially determine what 
weather must be avoided and what routes may be flown. There are several more 
relationships that could be pointed out, but they are not central to our discussion. 
................................. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The planner, then, is concerned with getting from a given origin to a given 
destination in a timely fashion and with a minimum of fuel consumed, while 
maintaining flight safety and passenger comfort. The planner must consider 
what routes to take (these routes consist of waypoints, or navigational points, and 
jet routes, the so-called 'highways in the sky' that connect the waypoints), what 
altitudes to  fly, what weather to avoid (including winds, thunderstorms, freezing 
rain, and turbulence), and hdshe must consider the ever changing capabilities of 
the plane (for example, the weight of the plane decreases as more he1 is 
consumed; the lighter the plane, the higher it can fly). 
The initial flight plan is rarely followed exactly, due to unforeseen events 
occurring while enroute. Indeed, minor changes in flight plans are frequently 
made and major changes are fairly common. 
These amendments to the original plan are due to the dynamic, 
unpredictable nature of the "world" in which the plans are carried out. Weather 
patterns do not always develop as predicted, resulting in unexpected areas of 
turbulence, less favorable tail winds or storms that must be avoided. Air traffic 
congestion may delay take-off or restrict the plane to lower than planned altitudes. 
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Airport or runway closures can cause major disruptions, not just for one aircraft, 
but for everyone planning on landing at that airport. Mechanical failures, 
medical emergencies or other critical problems may force the plane to divert to a 
nearby airport. 
- 
Enroute flight planning can be represented as search through a hierarchy 
of problem spaces (Laird, Newell, and Rosenbloom, 1987). When a problem - 
arises, as described above, the flight crew must - come up with a revised flight 
plan. To select this revised plan, a variety of alternative solution paths may be 
considered. 
A state description for one possible problem space representation consists 
Of: 
1. The plane’s current location (a point along its route and an altitude), 
airspeed, and attitude (direction of travel); 
The flight’s currently approved plan; 
Static and dynamic characteristics of the plane, such as its weight, 
its maximum altitude capabilities, its he1 consumption 
characteristics, etc. Characteristics that are normally considered 
static may in some cases change because of a problem such as engine 
failure; 
Actual and forecast weather along the plane’s current route and any 
possible alternate routes. The state description needs to include 
measures of uncertainty about weather forecasts, as well as the best 
2. 
3. 
4. 
“guess” of what the weather will be; 
Information on passenger connections and flight crew availabilities; 
Static and dynamic characteristics of airports that could be used for 
5. 
6. 
landing (runway lengths, visibility, air traffic congestion, etc.); 
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7. Similar information for any other planes whose paths could interact 
with possible alternative paths for the plane of concern. 
(This is a simplified summary of a state description.) 
Major operators include: 
1. changing altitude; 
Y. 9 changing airspeed; 
3. changing the route; 
4. changing the destination (a special, but important, case of changing 
the route). 
Each of these operators can be applied to either the plane of concern, or  to another 
plane with which its plan interacts. Furthermore, the first three operators can be 
applied to different segments of the flight. For example, the plane may fly at 
33,000 feet from Milwaukee to Chicago, but at 25,000 feet from Chicago to St. Louis. 
There are also a number of constraints. Planes must maintain a certain 
separation distance between both each other and thunderstorm cells (according to 
the Federal Air Regulations). Planes oRen fly along the jet routes and are also 
constrained to fly at certain altitudesl. Over the continental US., for instance, 
33,000 feet is an “eastbound only” altitude. There are also physical limitations, 
The plane can’t fly if it is out of fie1 and it can’t land at an airport with runways 
that are too short. 
Some of these constraints are actually “soft”, in that they may be violated in 
some circumstances. E, for instance, there is no eastbound traffic, Am Traffic 
Control (ATC) may allow a plane to fly west at an “eastbound only” altitude. 
Similarly, ATC may approve a vector that deviates from the jet routes in order to 
avoid a storm or save fuel. 
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Description of the state spaces, operators, and constraints is difficult 
because there are so many possibilities to consider. Definition of the evaluation 
function for selecting among operators is even more challenging, however. It is 
clear that multiple competing and complementary goals are considered 
(Wilensky, 1983) in evaluating preferences among alternative operators (or 
operator sequences). Safety, ke l  consumption, time, and passenger comfort are 
all important considerations. It is not as clear, though, exactly how human 
planners currently deal with tradeoffs among these goals. 
In short, the full problem space for enroute flight planning is very large 
and complex. Multiple goals must be considered in a highly stochastic 
environment where multiple plans must be coordinated. 
There are several areas of research which have a bearing on the current effort. 
Among these are computational approaches to planning, models of human 
planning, human-human cooperative problem solving, group problem solving, 
and human-machine cooperative problem solving (including decision support 
systems). Some of the pertinent literature for each of these areas is discussed 
below. 
In the following, the terms ‘plan’ and ‘subplan’ are used interchangeably; 
technically, a subplan is subordinate to  a plan, but because the scale is relative, it 
is often easier to simply use the term ‘plan’. It should be understood that all plan 
units can be viewed as subordinate to a larger plan. 
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1vl[odels of Planning 
of human behavior is often judged by whether or not that behavior fits in a logical 
plan. Furthermore, planning has been of interest to artificial i (AI) 
researchers because of the challenges it presents 
association with problem solving in general. 
cause of its close 
But how can planning be modeled by computational methods and what do 
these models have in common with human planning? Below we discuss some of 
the efforts to address these questions. 
First, models developed by Miller, Galanter and Pribnun (19601, Sacerdoti 
(19741, Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (19791, Suchman (19871, and Wilensky (1983) 
are discussed. Two simple operational definitions taken from Cohen and 
Feigenbaum (1982) will help in this discussion. A plan is "a representation of a 
course of action" and planning is "deciding on a cowse of action before acting" (p. 
515). 
Miller, Galanter, and Pribram. In 1960, Miller, Galanter, and Pribram began 
to lay a foundation for understanding human planning activities. The authors 
viewed humans as idormation processors, and their definition of a plan was 
"any hierarchical process in the organism which can control the order in which a 
ne of activities to a 
lo 
representation for plan knowledge and as a controller of behavior. The 'Test' 
phase checks for congruity between the desired state and the current state, while 
the 'Operate' phase constitutes the execution of an action to achieve the desired 
state. The action is repeated until the desired state is achieved. 
According to Miller, et al., the power of such a representation lies in the ability 
to put other TOTE units in the operate phase of higher order units, thus nesting 
the TOTE units. Their representation for driving a nail is shown in Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
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Model, As psychologists, Miller et al. were con 
modeling human performance. 
type of model with models developed by AI researchers, such as 
ABSTRIPS (Sacerdoti, 19'74) is a hierarchical planner that generates a hierarchy 
of representations for a plan. The highest representation in the hierarchy is an 
abstraction (simplification) of the plan, axid the lowest representation is a detailed 
list of actions required to solve the problem. Goals, objects, and/or operators may 
be abstracted. The purpose of such abstractions is to discriminate between items 
that are crucial to the success of a plan and those items that are details (i.e., tasks 
that are likely to be taken care of in a number of ways). ABSTRIPS first works at 
achieving the critical plan elements and then successively incorporates further 
levels of detail. 
ABSTRIPS' planning begins with a complete plan at the highest abstraction, 
which is then progressively refined until a detailed successful plan'is achieved. If 
a plan fails at one level of abstraction, the planner backs up to higher levels of 
abstraction until it reaches a choice point and then it takes a different path. Each 
level of abstraction contains all of the objects and operators given in the initial 
state (or ground space). 
A pred a l 0  
program by the programmerhowledge engineer, along with initial criticality 
(importance) values. ABS'I!RPS then adjusts these values. The adjustment 
procedure is: All preconditions whose truth value cannot be changed by any 
operator in the domain are assigned a maximum criticality value. For each of the 
remaining preconditions, if a short plan can be found to achieve it (assuming all 
previous processed preconditions are true), it is assumed to be a detail and is 
assigned a criticality equal to its rank in the partial order. If such a plan can not 
be found, the precondition is given a criticality greater than the highest value in 
the partial order. 
ABSTRZPS - An Example. The ABSTRIPS planner comes from the domain of 
'robot navigation', in which one is concerned with moving a robot between 
adjacent rooms and using the robot to move boxes. Although the following 
example plan, adapted from Cohen and Feigenbaum (1982), is not of robot 
navigation, it will help illustrate the ABSTRIPS model: 
"Consider now the problem of getting a cup of coffee. You go to the kitchen 
and if coffee is made, YOU pour some. If not, you make some or go out to buy 
some. If you decide to make some, but there are no coffee beans or ground 
coffee, you go to the store to get some. If you have no money, you go to the 
bank first." (p. 523). 
The relevant objects to be planned about are presented in Table 1. 
................................ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Some of #e operators (methods of action) and their preconditions and 
postconditions are presented in Table 2. 
Finally, the initial state is not having brewed coffee, and the goal state is a cup of 
brewed coffee. 
In this example, one might suppose that the most important precondition is 
that a place exists, since operators that depend on that place can only be used if it 
exists. Furthermore, one might suppose that having something is the next most 
important precondition, and finally, that being somewhere is the least important, . 
since it is most easily changed. The initial partial ordering supplied to 
ABSTRIPS is shown in Table 3. 
................................ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Following this reasoning, bank exists, coffee- bean store exists, brewed-coffee 
store exists, and kitchen exists are all assigned a maximum criticality (3 for now) 
because their truth cannot be changed by any operator (note that grinder store 
exists has not been processed). Have beans, have boiling water, and have money 
all can be achieved by 
therefore, they are assigned a cri 
hort plan, gwen that the previous preconditions are true; 
e somewhere preconditions 
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are assigned a value of 1 (equal to their rank in the initial partial order). These 
values are summarized in Table 4. 
..................................... 
Insert Table 4 about here 
After assigning all criticality values, ABSTRIPS begins to plan at the highest 
level of abstraction (criticality 5). It assumes that all preconditions with lesser 
criticality are true. Thus, for the goal of having brewed coffee, ABSTRIPS finds 
two possible plans to achieve it: make coffee and buy coffee. ABSTRIPS initially 
tries to make coffee. Once it has achieved a complete plan at this level, it moves 
down one level of abstraction and formulates a plan including all higher levels of 
abstraction, and so on until the goal is achieved or a dead-end is reached. In this 
case, since the grinder store does not exist, ABSTRIPS backtracks through 
abstraction levels to the last choice point and pursues the plan of buying brewed 
coffee and succeeds. 
ABSTRIPS - Contributions. The use of hierarchical abstraction spaces can 
facilitate finding dead-ends early, so that the amount of backtracking may be 
reduced compared to non-hierarchical planners (which treat all subgoals as 
having equal import). "his fact is important because the less backtracking the 
planner has to do, the faster a satisfactory plan can be found. If the solution space 
is very large, such efficiency may be important. 
Thus, the introduction of the concept of an abstraction hierarchy was one of the 
most significant developments of early computational planning work. Indeed, 
nearly all planners developed since ABSTRIPS have incorporated abstraction 
hierarchies because of their power in reducing search. 
Furthermore, ABSTRIPS was designed to accomplish multiple, non- 
interacting goals, while a number ofprevious planners could not handle more 
than one goal at a time. By pursuing multiple goals, ABSTRIPS takes a step 
toward being more 'human-like' than previous planners. 
Finally, the ABSTRIPS approach is relatively domain independent, so one 
could use it as a general purpose planning system in a variety of domains 
(provided one wanted to spend the time to represent the domain appropriately). 
ABSTRIPS - Limitations. ABSTRIPS could have trouble with conjunctive 
goals that interact. --Although it is possible to represent the domain such that 
ABSTRIPS implicitly considers such interactions by setting up one goal as a 
precondition for another, such ordering may not be possible with all domains. In 
such cases, the planner would have to be able to abandon or relax some of the 
goalskonstraints. 
- - 
Additionally, it is unlikely that people plan in the strictly top-down manner 
used by ABSTRIPS. Exclusive top-down planning can be inefficient in many 
situations (e.g., in errand running tasks). Such 'non-human' behavior may 
affect the acceptability of the plans produced by such planning systems or the 
acceptability of interactions with such systems (e.g., explanations produced to 
just* the recommended plan). 
Unlike top-down planners, people fiequently recognize opportunities to achieve 
multiple goals when planning for a single goal. Thus, people are to some extent 
'opportunistic', which leads to the planning model developed by Hayes-Roth and 
Ha ye s-Ro th. 
Hayes-Roth and Hayee-Roth- An opportunistcMode1. Hayes-Roth and 
Hayes-Roth (1979) studied human planning in a paper-and-pencil simulation of 
daily activities (running errands) and used the data obtained to develop a 
planning system that was very different fiom planners that had previously been 
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developed. In a nutshell, the theory is that humans plan at multiple levels of 
abstraction simultaneously, and that some planning is in fact bottom up. If the 
opportunity presents itself to achieve a goal while working toward another goal, 
that opportunity will be seized (hence the term 'opportunistic planning'). In 
another typical behavior, 'island driving', the problem solver finds a correct 
solution to a subplan (island) and then extends problem solving to  other subplans. 
The system developed by the Hayes-Roths achieved an opportunistic style of 
planning by using a blackboard architecture with multiple representations of 
planning knowledge and multiple levels of abstraction within those 
representations. This architecture has its roots in the Hearsay-I1 speech 
understanding system (Erman, Hayes-Roth, Lesser, and Reddy, 1980). Planning 
therefore had bottom-up and topdown components, with specialists that 
recognized both opportunities to achieve task-specific subgoals and opportunities 
to achieve meta-planning goals (such as conserving resources). 
Specifically, the authors assumed that many cognitive 'specialists' (a.k.a. 
'demons') act independently in making decisions that are incorporated into a 
plan. Specialists record their decisions on a common blackboard so that these 
decisions are made available for other specialists to use. The blackboard consists 
of five 'planes' which represent different conceptual categories of planning 
1. the 'plan' plane consists of actions that the planner intends to take; 
2. the 'plan-abstractions' plane contains desired attributes of plan 
decisions; 
3. the 'knowledge-base' plane consists of information about relationships 
in the world; 
4. the 'executive' plane contains decisions about the allocation of planning 
resources; and, 
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5. the 'meta-plan' plane consists of decisions about the planning process in 
use (i.e., the type of problem under consideration, the methods being 
used, evaluation criteria, etc.). 
These planes are hrther divided into levels of abstraction peculiar to each plane. 
According to Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, these abstraction levels provide a 
taxonomy of the decisions made and they restrict the number of prior decisions 
that must be considered by individual specialists. 
The cyclical planning process is controlled by the executive plane, which 
decides which one of the triggered specialists to fire during each cycle. The 
process repeats until a complete plan is developed, until a plan satisfies 
'important evaluation criteria', or until failure. 
Contributions. The more significant contribution of this work was the 
introduction of the idea of planning at multiple levels ofabstraction 
simultaneously. This allows a planner to capitalize on relationships in the 
environment when they are noticed. In other words, some components of human 
planning are no doubt bottom-up; presumably, this yields more efficient planning 
in some cases. 
Another benefit of the Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth model is that it uses 
multiple descriptions of the planning process. Thus, the planner can reason 
about aspects of the environment or the planning process which aren't directly 
associated with the plan itself. For example, the planner may notice that there 
are multiple errands in the southeast corner of the city, or that pursuing a 
particular aspect of the plan will require too many cognitive resources. 
Limitations. From the standpoint of the present work, there are two 
drawbacks to this model. First, the planning task was very simple: There were 
no significant constraints on errands. The only factor that typically constrains 
errand planning, time, was removed from the experiment. 
Second, all planning work was undertaken in advance of acting (in fact, the 
subjects never were required to enact their plans), whereas humans tend to 
develop loose plan structures and rely on specific environmental feedback during 
plan execution to guide them in the details. As previously discussed, the act of 
carrying out one's plans frequently leads to replanning. The 'think then act' 
problem is endemic to all computational planners, and more will be said about it 
later. It bears mentioning here because of the claims made by the Hayes-Roths 
and because it is precisely the issue brought up by Suchman (discussed below). 
Suchman - The Situated &tion ModeL Like the Hayes-Roths, Suchman (1987) 
has also been involved in analyzing everyday actions. From Suchman's point of 
view, most activities revolve around direct interaction with the environment and 
relatively little behavior is extensively planned. Suchman forcefully argues her 
views in the following paragraphs from the preface of her book 
"...however planned, purposeful actions are inevitably situated 
actions .... actions taken in the context of particular, concrete 
circumstances ...[ T'Jhe circumstances of our actions are never filly 
anticipated and are continuously changing around us. As a consequence 
our actions, while systematic, are never planned in the strong sense that 
cognitive science would have it. Rather, plans are best viewed as a weak 
rt?source for what is primarily ad hoc activity. It is only when we are 
pressed to account for the rationality of our actions ... that we invoke the 
guidance of a plan. Stated in advance, plans are necessarily vague, insofar 
as they must accommodate the unforeseeable contingencies of particular 
situations. Reconstructed in retrospect, plans systematically filter out 
precisely the particularity of detail that characterizes situated actions, in 
favor of those aspects of the actions that can be seen to accord with the 
plan." (pp. viii-ix). 
Contributions and Limitations. Suchman's point that most plans serve 
primarily as a frame . It is certainly true of a 
lot of behavior, such as in the human-machine interaction studies which slie 
carried out, and there is a tendency for people to ascribe to notio 
order to rationalize behavior. But it i s  precisely this framework 
consideration. Furthermore, there are domains and activities that require 
considerable detailed planning before actions can be initiated. Succesafid 
businessmen and businesswomen certainly do not decide to introduce a new 
product on a whim. Rather, they carry out market surveys, determine the cost of 
production, analyze the actions of their competitors, and determine- what effects 
the sale of the new product will have on profit margins, long term equity, 
goodwill, etc. I 
Enroute flight planning makes use of both plans and situated action. Flight 
planning is a complex activity characterized by multiple interacting goals and 
constraints. Furthermore, because airplanes travel at a relatively high rate of 
speed (thus there is sometimes rather little time available for planning), pilots, 
dispatchers, and ATC must have some relatively detailed contingency plans 
developed prior to actually using them. Indeed, pilots are required to have such 
contingency plans prior to taking off. However, such planning is a somewhat 
separate activity from the moment by moment actions required to keep the wings 
on course. In this view, Suchman's conceptions can be 
seen to fit nicely within the purview of the Executor in Wilensky's (1983) model: 
The E n the s of a plan in carrying it out. 
Wilensky. In 1983, Wilensky described a more comprehensive approach to 
computational planning. He proposed that an efficient planner would have plan 
frameworks stored in memory that could be retrieved according to the goal which 
they achieved. The planner would be able to reason about the future and how the 
hture would be aSected as a result of planned actions. The planner would also be 
able to develop new goals based on the situations in which it found itself. 
Furthermore, the planner would be able to detect interactions between 
subgoals and to plan according to those interactions by relaxing or abandoning 
some of its subgoals or by trying to achieve multiple subgoals at the same time. 
The planner should also be able to take into account the goals and actions of other 
agents. Some of the details of a plan would not be able to be decided upon until 
plan execution. Finally, the planner should be able to reason about the plans 
themselves, thus performing meta-planning. Meta-planning would be concerned 
with conserving resources, achieving as many goals as possible at the same time, 
maximizing the value of the goals achieved, and avoiding impossible goals. 
The components of Wilensky's planning system are described as follows: 
"1. Goal Detector--This mechanism is responsible for determining that the 
planner has a go al... [Tlhe Goal Detector notices situations ... that have 
arisen that are relevant to the planner ... 
2. Plan Proposer--This component's task is to  find stored plans relevant to  
current goals ... The Plan Proposer is also responsible for expanding 
plans into component plans. ..for further planning or execution.. . 
3. Projector--The purpose of this component is to test plans by building 
hypothetical world models ...m his ability is used to debug current plans 
by simulating a fbture that m a y  contain undesirable elements, thus 
enabling the goal detector to form new goals ... 
2l 
4. Ex --...[TI he Executor tries to 
actio ns... This may require expandi 
they can be directly executed and detecting interactio 
at this level." (p. 22). 
These components interact as shown in Figure 3. 
................................ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Contributions. Wilensky is to be commended for his efforts to model many of 
the components which make up human planning activities. Particularly notable 
are his efforts to include multiple agents, stored plans, the effects of the plannerk 
actions on the world, subgoal interactions, and the uncertainties involved in plan 
execution. His model goes beyond studying one major aspect of planning in 
isolation of others. 
Limitations. As a conceptual model, it is hard to find fault with Wilensky's 
framework. On the other hand it is likely that such a comprehensive approach to 
planning would be difficult for anyone to implement for significant real-world (as 
opposed to toy) planning tasks. 
Operations Research Models, In contrast to these symbolic reasoning 
models, the field of operations research has developed quantitative tools to help 
with planning ac6vities. These may involve the use of linear programming 
techniques or decision analytic approaches (Holman, 1989). They require 
detailed mathematical descriptions of the decision problem, and in one sense or  
another seek optimal plans or solutions, thus contrasting with AI approaches 
which generally are sati 
rather than optimal solutions. 
utational methods that produce "goodf 
Models of Planning - Conclusion. Research such as that described above 
has had a major impact on our understanding of planning. It has served to 
provide a conceptual framework for understanding the task of planning, as well 
as to outline different strategies for accomplishing such tasks, including 
strategies applied by human planners. As wil l  be described later, these insights 
were of great value in guiding our system development efforts. 
CoopesatVePr0kSohTingSyste;tns 
Cooperative problem solving is really an extension of past efforts at joint 
human-machine problem solving, but with a shift in emphasis away from 
machine-dominated approaches. This shift in emphasis has been fairly recent, 
so relatively few studies have been conducted on cooperative problem solving 
systems. However, there have been some conclusions drawn from this and 
related work which indicate what types of system characteristics may be 
beneficial to cooperative problem solving. . 
Decision Support Systems. Decision support systems OSS) are an 
outgrowth of management information systems (MIS) in the decision science and 
business communities. Whereas MISS are typically automated methods for 
monitoring and summarizing financial data without interpretation, DSSs use 
these data along with a model of aspects of a given enterprise and of the external 
environment to provide managers with feedback to hypothetical situations. For 
example, a company may use a decision support system to help determine the 
pricing for a new product in a competitive environment. DSSs are typically used 
for strategic planning (long range planning--over two years) and management 
controlkactical planning (moderate term planning--approximately six months to 
two years) in business environments. 
There is a wide range of software programs that have been labeled decision 
support systems. For example, Thierauf (1988) lists report generators, electronic 
spreadsheets, financial planning languages, and statistical an 
tems. A DSS develop 
connected to a maidrame and use a shell, called a 
designed for producing decision support systems, or hdshe may work at a 
personal computer using Lotus 1-2-3. Similarly, the developer may be a 
managedend-user of the DSS, or hdshe may be a DSS builderhowledge 
engineer called in to assist in the project. 
The general design principles for such systems tend to be rather vague. 
Authors tend to use blanket statements such as “use up-to-date information”, “the 
system should respond in a timely manner”, and “present information in a 
concise and appropriate manner” (which often means graphically) (cf. Bidgoli, 
1989; Holsapple and Winston, 1987; Davis, 1988; Thierauf, 1988). 
As an example, Hall (1988) developed a decision support system and studied 
its effect on strategic planning. The author found that those subjects who used 
the system developed much better strategic plans than those who did not 
(according to independent judges), and that managerial experience did not play a 
role. Hall did not study how behavior changed as a result of using the decision 
support system. 
H m - M a c h i n e  Cooperative Problem Solving Studies There are several 
studies which are particularly relevant to cooperative problem solving. Coombs 
md Alty (19841, although they didn’t study human-computer cooperative problem 
solving, identif!ied possibly desirable aspects of the approach; Shute and Smith (in 
press) similarly studied humanFhuman cooperative problem solving, but had 
results which M e r  &om those of Coombs and Alty; Mitchell and Saisi (1987) 
stu COO e system for satellite idormation display and control; 
Suchman (1987, already discussed in the context of computational approaches to 
planning) studied interactions with an ‘expert’ copier; Roth, Bennett, and Woods 
(1987) studied technicians using an expert system for fault diagnosis and repair; 
and Lehner and Zirk (1987) studied h e  effects of mental models of a computer's 
processing on performance. The first two studies were conducted on systems 
which were cooperative by design, while the Suchman and Roth, Bennett, and 
Woods studies were conducted on systems that were authoritarian by design, but 
became cooperative (actually, uncooperative) in practice. 
Coombs and AZty. As mentioned, Coombs and Alty didn't study cases of - 
human-machine cooperative problem solving; rather, they studied human- 
human interactions and discovered aspects of such interactions which may be of 
use in building a cooperative human-machine system. The authors suggested 
that human experts rarely are asked to give solutions to hard problems (which 
runs counter to the idea behind expert systems); instead, they are asked to provide' 
assistance in promoting the understanding of a problem area. The following 
activities were said to aid in promoting understanding 
"a. providing relevant contextual information; 
b. focusing attention on important topics in the subject area; 
c. helping to predict outcomes of given processing circumstances." (p. 22). 
In studying advisory interactions at a university computing center, the 
authors made two observations. First, interactions in which the advisor 
controlled the conversation were judged unsatisfactory, due in part to a lack of 
feedback and a lack of description of how information was being used in the 
reasoning process (or, indeed, what that process was). Second, advisory 
encounters that were judged as satisfactory were characterized by: 
1. both parties sharing the advisor and client roles; 
2. the parties keeping assumptions, information, and strategies explicit; 
and, 
3. both parties gaining insights into problems and solution methods. 
Shute and Smith. In contrast to Coombs and Alty, Shute and Smith (in 
press) studied human-h 
information seekers in the domain of information retrieval. In this case, the 
expert search intermediary guided the interactions with the information seeker 
in order to be#er define the information seeker’s interests. In particular, the 
intermediaries, who were experts in the subject matter of interest to the 
information seekers, devoted much of their time to teaching the information 
seekers about the subject area. They did so by suggesting related topics that might 
be of interest. Although the information seekers had control in the sense that they 
provided feedback to the intermediaries about the relevance of suggested topic 
refinements, the intermediaries largely controlled the conversations. Contrary to 
s between search intermedi 
- 
Coombs and Alty’s conclusion, the information seekers were quite satisfied with 
such interactions. 
Furthermore, the expert intermediaries automatically handled lower level 
details such as selecting appropriate commands (e.g.,. display all 1-3 or search 
water pollutiodCV) or choosing appropriate logical operators (e.g.,. AND, 
WITH), offen with little or no explanation to the information seeker. When 
explanation was provided, it was generally given in the form of tutoring (in case 
the information seeker had to do such a search on hidher own someday). 
Such results suggest that acceptable roles and interaction styles are 
dependent on the nature of the task and the types of assistance available from the 
expert consultant. 
Mitchell and Saisi. Mitchell and Saisi (1987) compared two different 
satellite display and control system designs. The first design was one actually 
and was c ed by a data availability approach to 
design (data avaihbility designs display raw data organized by data 
type). The second design centered on the activities of the operator. This system 
utilized analogical representations and i 
collections of data (these collections were 
sensitive to the state of the system). They found that operators 
systems performed much better overall on the second (activity-oriented) system 
than on the original system. 
Suchman. Suchman (1987) studied interactions with a copier that gave 
‘expert’ guidance for its use. Suchman observed that significant communication 
diaculties arose for novices. In general, she found communication failures due 
to ambiguous instructions, rigid procedures (unanticipated variability), a lack of 
direct access by the person to the machine’s ‘reasoning‘ processes, and a similar 
lack of access by the computer to the misunderstandings held by the person using 
the copier. 
Roth, Bennett, and Woods. Roth, Bennett, and Woods (1987) found similar 
communication difficulties in a study of technicians wing an expert system to 
trouble-shoot a malfunctioning device. These authors found that the technician’s 
level of expertise and degree of active participation in problem solving greatly 
affected overall performance and success. 
Lehner and Zirk. Lehner and Zirk (1987) studied the extent to which a 
person’s mental model of an expert system’s decision processes affected the joint 
performance of the person and expert system. Lehner and Zirk studied subjects 
in a simulated stock purchasing task. The authors found that if the subjects had 
a good model of the expert system’s problem-solving approach, combined 
performance was better if. the subject and computer used different problem- 
solving methods than if they used the same approach. 
h is related to human-computer 
‘groupware’, wherein a 
computer system s an intermediary b een people working together on 
problems. Electronic mail is sometimes called gro 
support the activities of 
software which is 
Ciborra, and Proffitt (1990) developed a system to assist commercial airline pilots 
in the process of bidding for flights (pilots bid on which flights they wish to fly; 
flights go to the highest bidder). 
Cooperative Systems - Discussion. As summarized earlier, studies of 
planning have served to identify considerations that should be addressed in 
developing computerized aids for planning. Studies of human-human and 
human-computer cooperative problem solving have identified additional 
questions , including: 
1. Who should control the interactions and directions for exploration? 
2. What expertise can the “client” bring to the problem solving process? 
3. Is it possible to provide the computer with idormationhowledge which 
may be beyond a given person’s expertise? 
4. Is there an opportunity to teach the human agent usefbl strategies? 
5. What happens when the human agent has information which is not 
available to the computer? 
6. What are the goals of the human user and how can the interface be 
organized around these? 
7. Is the system robust/flexibl 
8. Is thesystem 
9. Is it possible to provide the operator with an appropriate model of the 
different problem solving styles? 
computer’s problem solving processes? 
ns to be done to ans r these questions (and to 
e applicable). 
EIlrouteFligihtmanning~ 
tional re1 
profile planning (OPTIM), a stand-alone enroute 
proposed cooperative system approach to enroute flight planning (Personalized 
- 
Flight Replanner). These are discussed below. 
OPTIM. Most flight planning systems to date have used optimization 
techniques to develop their plans and they have be 
planning, as opposed to enroute planning. In fact there are many commercial 
systems that will allow a person to see weather information and develop flight 
plans; these systems will propose flight plans based on the performance 
characteristics of a given aircraft. Although these systems incorporate data on 
prevailing winds in such computations, they do not generally consider other 
weather concerns.) 
ncerned with preflight 
OPTIM (Sorensen, Waters, & Patmore, 1983) was developed to generate 
near optimal vertical flight profile for a given aircraft over a given horizontal - 
route (consisting of waypoints and jet routes) and with given winds and 
temperatures at the waypoints along the route. Specifically, OPTIM minimizes 
the output value of an algebraic function consisting of factors which specify the 
cost of fbel, the cost of time, the aircraft9s fbel flow rate, the aircraft's ground 
speed, the aircraft's airspeed, the aircraft's thrust and drag coefficients, and the 
aircraft's weight; the ground speed is determi 
wind velocity. OPTIM was not conc 
s velocity and the 
d come up with 
the necessary horizontal flight plan for input. 
Diverter. Diverter (Rudolph, Homoki, & Sexton, 1990) represents an 
atte ystem to devel ans for diversion 
to a new destination d to deviating enroute maintaining 
the same destination airport). Diverter uses production rules, Air Traffic Control 
2 9 '  
reports, aircraft system status, and a datab 
about plans to alternative destinations. The production rules contain information 
on aircraft performance characteristics, Federal Air Regulations, and 
navigational and weather avoidance heuristics. For each diversion option, 
Diverter evaluates the runways, airfields, and routes independently based on a 
variety of factors (e.g., safety, weather, fuel consumption, etc.) and then combines 
these evaluations for a total diversion ‘score’. The diversions are then rank 
ordered according their scores and the top option is selected by the computer and 
recommended to the pilot. The major drawbacks to Diverter are that: 
of airfields and routes to reason 
1. Control is limited to assigning weights for the various attributes used 
in search; 
Important criteria (such as passenger connections) are totally 
ignored by the system; and, 
It provides no means for using it as a tool in which the human adds 
in considerations of additional criteria. 
2. 
3. 
Personalized Flight Replanner. Cohen, Leddo, and Tolcott (1989), 
investigated a cooperative approach to enroute flight planning. They proposed a 
system in which, for each situation encountered, the pilot would be responsible for 
determining what parameters would affect enroute flight planning decisions and 
for determining the relative importance of those factors. The proposed system 
consisted of five modules: 
1. a plan (bird‘s eye) view of the route, weather, air traffic, and airports; 
(profile) view of weather and traflic; 
an ‘uncertainties’ module, which would be used to  evaluate 3. 
acy of routes (e.g.,report X indicates 
destination prior to arrival, report Y 
indicates that it will); 
4. an ‘evaluation’ module for 
likelihood of achieving go 
turbulence, but route B will 
5. a ‘goals’ module, where 
various flight parameters (e.g., fuel remaining should be greater 
than 6000 lbs. at the destination). 
All of these modules would be cross-referenced and the pilot could request 
assistance from the computer for evaluating any of the modules or  filling in flight 
parameters. While these are interesting ideas, this flight replanning system 
exists only as a paper mockup. 
-&-- ‘on 
Above, three literatures were briefly reviewed. As discussed, publications 
on models of planning (by humans and by computers) provide important insights 
into the nature of planning as a task and into strategies for accomplishing such 
tasks. The literature on cooperative systems raises interesting questions that 
need to be considered when developing an interactive planning system. Finally, 
the literature on flight planning systems identifies some of the important factors 
to deal with in designing a system specifically for that task. 
Below, we describe the design of a system based on the considerations 
suggested by these literatures. Then we present the results of an empirical study 
of three variations on this system design. 
d to test sever 
ign was devel 
extensive cognitive task analysis (Smith, McCoy, Layton, 
four flight plans in c 
weather information and to obtain feedback in terms of flight parameters such as 
fuel, time, and distance. The weather information consists of both graphic 
depictions and verbal descriptions and can be displayed at several altitudes. The 
displays show the entire flight path, thus emphasizing global solutions to 
problems. In addition, the person can manipulate the display time to see the 
relationship between the weather information and the plane's position. The 
system computes the optimal vertical profile to minimize fuel consumption, 
amval times at waypoints, and fbel remaining at those waypoints, based on 
winds components. It also determines these flight parameters given a user- 
selected vertical profile. 
The basic system runs on a Macintosh I E  with two color monitors. The 
features and functions on each monitor are discussed in turn. 
LeftMonitOr 
The displays and controls on the left monitor are shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
(In all of the f'yrures which depict system displays, some of the information loses 
saliency as printed here in black and white instead of color.) 
Insert figures 4 and 5 about here 
The primary feature on the left monitor is a map display. This display 
continental United States, the aircraft position, and planned routes. 
be overlaid on map. This information 
includes: 
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1. Weather idormation, which consists of the following: 
a. ‘composite clouds’-- which depicts cloud cover, cloud bases and tops, and 
cloud type (this is similar to a ‘US. High Level Significant Weather 
Prognostic Chart’ with the idormation on the jet stream, tropopause 
heights, and turbulence removed); 
b. ‘composite radar’-- which depicts radar returns, cell intensities, cell 
types, cell direction and speed of movement, and cell tops (this is similar 
to a color ‘Radar Summary Chart’); 
c. ‘fronts’-- which depicts frontal positions, types of fronts, and high and 
low pressure areas (this is similar to a ‘Surface Analysis Chart’ with 
the isobars removed); 
d. ‘clouds at altitude’-- which depicts the cloud cover at an altitude selected 
by the operator (these altitudes range from 23,000 feet to 33,000 feet); 
e. ‘radar at altitude‘-- which depicts radar returns, cell intensities, cell 
types, and cell direction and speed of movement at an altitude selected by 
the operator (these altitudes range firom 23,000 feet to 33,000 feet; this 
display is similar to airborne radar with the exception that it depicts the 
entire continental U.S.; 
f. ‘winds at altitude’-- which depicts wind direction and speed at an 
altitude selected by the operator (these altitudes range firom 23,000 feet to 
33,000 feet; this display is similar to an ‘Observed Winds Aloft Chart’ 
without the temperatures associated with the winds); 
2. Jet routes and waypoints-- which depicts all of the waypoints (navigational 
points) and jet routes (the ‘highways in the sky’ that connect waypoints) 
which are normally found on the ‘IF’R Enroute High Altitude Charts’ for 
the continental U.S.; these jet routes and way points are shown in Figure 6. 
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times: The ‘current 
current position. One can also ‘zoom in’ on a region of the map, which replaces 
that map of the continental U.S. with a magnification of an area surrounding an 
operator-selected point. Similarly, the user can ‘unzoom’ back to the map of the 
continental US. 
................................ 
Insert figure 6 about here 
The last general item of interest on this monitor is a ‘notification window’ 
which presents the person with important information regarding the various 
planned routes (e.g., a warning that the plane wi l l  consume all of its &el before 
reaching the chosen destination). 
RightlMonitor 
The right monitor displays and controls are shown in Figure 7. 
It displays a ‘flight log‘ of a route. This flight log is essentially a spreadsheet 
which depicts each segment of the route (ie., all of the waypoints and jet routes 
which make up the route), as well as information pertinent to those segments. 
This information consists of the arrival time and &el remaining at each 
waypoint, the ge de and speed for each segment, as well as other flight 
parameters. The flight log also graphically displays the planned altitudes for the 
route and the least-&el-consumption altitudes for that route. Finally, the flight 
lo S on which is pertinent to the route. For example, 
turbulence idormation is on by default, but the person can also select information 
on the winds. The turbulence information that is presented is a one-word 
34 
summary of the maximum turbulence on a 
can get a more detailed des t i  
‘pireps’) by selecting (‘clicking‘ on) the one-word 
............................. 
Insert figure 7 about here 
The monitor displays four flight segments at a h e ,  but it is not large 
enough to display longer routes. Therefore, the flight log has to be ‘scrolled‘, so 
that infomation which is not currently on the screen will be displayed. 
Furthermore, the operator can select which route to display in the flight log at any 
given time (the flight log displays only one route at a time). 
The other display on this monitor (at the bottom of the screen) shows the 
flight parameters for all four alternative routes upon arrival at the destination. 
These parameters include time of arrival, time enroute, he1 remaining, and total 
distance. This display allows users to compare the ‘bottom line’ for each route, 
F’FT-ImpOrtantFea~ 
The design principles underlying FPT as a cooperative planning system are 
discussed in detail in Smith, McCoy, Layton and Bihari (1992). Five of the most 
significant considerations, however, are: 
1. Provide tools that allow cooperative planning at different levels of 
abstraction (inspired by the work of Sac 
Hayes-Roth; Shute and Smith; and Suchman); 
Provide the human planner with data displays and representations 
support plan gener and eval els of 
; Hayes-Roth and 
2. 
abstraction; 
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3. Provide cognitive interfaces to the avail 
the person to easily communicate desi 
Provide tools that help the person predict the outcomes of various 
plans (Coombs and Alty, 1987); 
Incorporate a graphical interface that allows the person to view and 
explore alternative plans in the context of the relevant data 
(i . e. ,weather displays). 
port tools that allow 
4. 
5. 
Below we describe an empirical study to assess some of these design 
considerations. 
, .  
In the study described below, FPT was used as a testbed to study the effects of 
Merent design features on cooperative problem solving performance. Briefly, 
each of the thirty subjects (professional airline pilots) was asked to use one of 
three alternative system designs (ten subjects per condition). Each subject was 
trained on the use of that version of the system and given four cases to solve. 
As mentioned above, three different enroute flight planning support 
systems were designed. In actuality, these three systems represented variations 
on the levels and timing of support provided by the computer. These variations on 
the system design represented the independent variable studied in this 
experiment. three different versions are discussed below. 
The ‘Sketching only‘ System. The ‘sketching only system allowed the 
human planner to sketch proposed flight paths on a map display, while the 
CO r filled in lower level details (such as fuel remaining, time of arrival, and 
recommended altitudes) by using an optimization program that found an altitude 
profile and speeds that minimized consumption (taking into account wind 
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components). In this version, the person was responsible for proposing the 
alternate paths, while the computer was responsible fo computational 
feedback on those solutions. The computer did not take an active role in planning 
deviations in this version. 
The sketching of routes was carried out by displaying the jet routes and 
waypoints and selecting ('clicking' on) each waypoint that the pilot wanted the 
airplane to pass through. Such routes were constrained to paths where there was 
a jet route connecting the desired waypoints; if there was no jet route connecting 
two waypoints, then the pilot was not allowed to propose that route. This placed a 
slight restriction on the pilots' planning abilities because they can normally 
request vectoring to fly direct routes from one point to another. However, this 
approached allowed them to plan general solutions with the understanding that 
these solutions were not necessarily the exact routes that would actually be flown. 
The aoUte Constmhts and Sketching' System. The 'route constraints and 
sketching' system retained all of the capabilities of the 'sketching only' system 
and it added another capability: The person could specify higher level constraints 
on the type of solution he desired and then ask the computer to find the shortest 
distance route which satisfied those constraints. Ifthe computer was unable to 
find a route that met the constraints placed on it, it would so noti& the person. 
The constraints that could be specified were the maximum allowable turbulence, 
the maximum allowable precipitation, and the destination. (It is easy to see how 
this interface design concept could be extended to include other constraints such 
as earliest and latest desired arrival times.) This tool places a substantial burden 
on the computer to work out the details of the alternative flight plan. 
on a desired solution is a very different "problem 
,1987) than tbe one faced by the person spa 
using the 'sketching only' version of the system. In the 'sketching only' version, 
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the person’s explanation is grounded in the representation of the physical space 
(e.g., the waypoints and jet routes) and the relationships of the objects within that 
space (e.g., aircraft position, storm position, wind velocities at various locations 
and altitudes, etc.). We hypothesized that the ‘route constraints’ version would 
allow the person to abstractly control the computer’s search of the physical world, 
while not being required to search for paths in that space himself. 
Both the person and the computer could be actively involved in the planning 
process with this system. The person could specify constraints on the solution he 
desired from the computer. The computer would then recommend appropriate 
alternatives. Furthermore, the person had recourse, through the sketching tool, 
to plan specific routes himself. Reasons for the person to carry out such detailed 
planning in spite of the availability of the route constraints tool could include a 
preference to do the work himself or reservations about a particular solution 
suggested by the computer. 
T‘he‘AutonratieRoutecoastraints,RoutecOastraint9,andSketching 
System. The ‘automatic route constraints, route constraints, and sketching‘ 
version took the computer’s involvement one step further in that the computer 
automatically suggested a deviation (based on default constraints of no 
turbulence, no precipitation, and the originally planned destination) as soon as it 
detected a problem with the original route. This form of tool is akin to an 
autonomous support system that automatically suggests solutions to detected 
problems. 
This system also had the ‘route constraints’ tool of the previous system and 
the ‘sketching‘ tool of the previous two systems. Thus, the person could also use 
these tools to explore solutions. 
Underlying all three system designs is the provision of support to ask ‘what 
if questions. That is, they encourage the operator to ask ‘what if I do this?’ (e.g., 
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‘what type of solution does the computer suggest if I use constraints of light 
turbulence and moderate precipitation?’, or ‘What happens to my &el remaining 
i f1  deviate north instead of south?’). We were interested in whether people used 
the tools available to them, how the available tools affected the cognitive processes 
of the person using the system, and how the available tools affected-the solutions 
that person chose. 
=hi- 
Thirty male commercial airline pilots volunteered to help evaluate the three 
systems. These pilots came from the flying community at large. Each pilot was 
paid for the three hours that it took to participate; approximately half of that time 
was spent training the pilot on the system he would be using. Each pilot was 
randomly assigned to one of the system design conditions, either the ‘sketching 
only’ condition, the ‘route constraints and sketching‘ condition, or the ‘automatic 
route constraints, route constraints, and sketching‘ condition. The pilots came 
from 8 major airlines, with an average of 9,300 hours of flying experience - 
experience as commercial pilots (range: 1200 - 28000 hours) and 1800 hours of 
experience in military aircraft (range: 0 - 5000 hours). In the results presented 
below, there were no apparent relationships between the pilots’ performances and 
their levels or types of flying experience, nor with their levels of previous 
computer experience. 
CZWS 
Following training on the use of the system, each of the subjects was 
presented four enroute flight planning cases in which he was given some 
preliminary Sonnation about the flight (e.g., origin, destination, time of day, 
etc.) and was then told to “decide what the plane should do”. All  of the subjects 
went through the same four cases in the same order. Whereas the subjects in the 
‘sketching only’ and ‘route constraints and sketching‘ conditions started each 
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case with only their original route of flight, the subjects in the ‘automatic route 
constraints, route constraints, and sketching‘ condition were also given an 
alternate route suggested by the computer based on the default constraints of 
finding a route that was predicted to avoid all turbulence and precipitation. 
Details on these cases are included in discussions of the results. 
Below we describe the performances of the pilots on the four test cases. 
Case 1 
The following scenario was read to the subjects prior to their working on 
this case: 
“It is summer and you’re on a flight from Battleground (Portland) to 
Northbrook. Your dispatcher gave you a southerly route in order to avoid 
an occluded front. The front has dropped to the south as well, however, and 
has generated some thunderstorms. Time out was 1700 Zulu and you are 
five minutes into the flight. Decide what you think the plane should do.” 
For subjects in the treatment condition in which the computer automatically 
suggested a solution upon loading the case, the following two lines were added 
(prior to “Decide what you think...”): 
“The computer has suggested the orange route as an alternative to the 
original plan (the green route) based on constraints of no turbulence and no 
precipitation. You may accept either of these plans or develop your own.” 
The original route, the current aircraft position, and the current composite radar 
are shown in Figure 8. The radar returns show a d i d  line of thunderstorms 
with cell tops at 37,000 feet. (For this experiment, the pilots were told the 
aircraft’s maximum altitude was 33,000 feet.) Furthermore, the gap between the 
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two cells was forecast to close. Therefore, a deviation was obviously required. The 
forecast storm movement was to the east, but was very 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
To provide a concrete sense of the performances of the subjects, the behaviors of 3 
representative pilots are first summarized below. Then s u m m a r y  statistics are 
provided for the entire group. 
Subject S1: 'Sketching Only' Version. Subject S1 looked at the composite 
radar and fi-onts (current and forecast) and concluded "Going to  have to go north 
or south around it". This pilot then sketched a northern deviation and compared . 
it with the original route, noting that the deviation saved time and he1 and 
avoided the turbulence. He then sketched a southern deviation. While sketching 
the deviation, he inferred that "it could move a little W h e r  south [than 
forecast]", so he adjusted the southern alternative for that contingency. When the 
route was completed he looked at the computer's estimates for time and fuel 
consumption and stated: "That onek quite a bit longer." He concluded "We 
could go that way if we had to." The pilot decided, however, to take the northern 
route. 
Subject c3. 'Route Constraints and Sketching' Version. Subject C3 looked 
at the composite radar and concluded "I can see right now that what I want to  do 
is come to the no rth..." ARer also looking at the clouds, he decided: "There's a 
line [of thunderstorms] so I definitely don't want to get anywhere near that ..." 
After observing that "it looks like a shorter route here [north], anyhow" and 
looking at the winds, he decided to let the computer find a deviation based on 
constraints of light turbulence and light precipitation. The subject looked at the 
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resultant northern deviation suggested by the computer and stated:- "That looks 
like about what I would have in minil." After checking the data displayed on the 
national map to make sure that the northern deviation had "no problems with 
turbulence or precipitation", he compared it with the original route and noted 
that: "The total distance is actually a little less. Fuel lea is more, and we'll 
actually cut time off our flight with this route." He then decided to fly the 
computer recommended northern deviation. 
SubjectA9: 'AutomaticRoute Constraints, Route Constraints and 
Sketching Version'. The computer automatically displayed a recommendation 
around the north of the storm to this pilot. He began his evaluation by comparing 
the estimated time and fuel consumption for this suggested route (to the north of 
the storm) with the performance parameters for the original route. He looked at 
the composite radar and noted that: "[The] original route goes right through an 
area of. ..heavy precipitation. A lot of echoes. Alternate route goes above [north ofl 
it." Next, this pilot looked at the winds and decided: "The winds are more 
favorable with the southerly [original] route, but obviously the weather's not that 
great." After "looking at the comfort level of the passengers", this subject 
concluded: "The alternate route certainly looks better to me and I would stick 
with that." He then looked again at the destination parameters for the two routes 
and summarized their differences as follows: "It's [the deviation] a little bit 
quicker and we aren't going to have any turbulence. We're going to get there a 
little sooner. The distance is less. The alternate route looks good to me." Finally, 
he said "I'd go with the [computer's suggested] route. I really can't see any 
better way I could plan it right now '' 
Comparison of Sample Subjec. b. F'igure 9 shows the routes explored in 
detail by these sample subjects. The subject in the 'sketching only' version of FPT 
(Sl) explored the far northern route and the southern route, and elected to take the 
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computer's suggested northern deviation. Only two of 
'sketching only' version selected thatroute. Six of the ten subje the 
'sketching only' version selected a more conservative northern deviation. (Based 
on a Chi-square test, these differences are significant at ac.004.) 
ten subjects in the 
Differences in Exploration. As shown in Table 5, subjects using the 
'sketching only' version explored multiple classes of solutions in detail more often 
than did the subjects in the other two conditions. (In this case, exploring a 
solution north of the storm was defined as one class of solution, while exploring a 
solution south of the storm was a second.) This difTerence was significant at 
ac.01. 
- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Table 6 shows data regarding another measure of the amount of exploration. 
This table shows the number of subjects who explored multiple specific solutions 
in detail (as contrasted with multiple classes of solutions as summarized in Table 
5). Again, the subjects in the 'sketching only' version showed eviderice of more 
exploration (a<.014). 
................................ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
Differences in Info h. The information which the subjects 
on. The nkmber of 
subjects in each condition who looked at current or forecast fronts, current or 
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forecast radar weather (composite or at altitude), current or 
altitude, and jet routes is presented in Table 7. 
cast winds at 
................................. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
As can be seen from this table, there are no clear differences between 
groups in information searched, with the exception that more of the 'sketching 
only' and 'route constraints and sketching' subjects looked at the jet routes than 
the 'automatic route constraints, route constraints, and sketching' subjects. This 
latter fact suggests the possibility that half of the 'automatic route constraints' 
subjects evaluated the suggested route at a fairly abstract level (this one difference 
is significant at a<.013.) 
Case 1 - Discussion. Prior to the experiment, we made two predictions that 
are relevant to these results. Specifically, we predicted that, in general, the pilots 
using the 'automatic' version might be: 
1. Less likely than the 'sketching only' subjects to explore as many 
alternatives in detail; 
Less likely than the 'sketching only' subjects to consider the 
uncertainty associated with wea casts, consequently 
2. 
accepting the computer's recommendation without adequate 
evaluation. 
The results for Case 1 are 
and 6, for example, indicate 
alternatives. Furthermore, the concurrent verbal reports indicate that the 
sistent with these general predictions. Tables 5 
the. 'sketching only' subjects explored more 
'sketching only' subjects who deviated further north (see 
considt ring the uncertainty associated with the forecast, ma 
) were indeed 
statements like: 
"If the system moved W h e r  north and the thunderstorms 
started to pop up... Let's take a look at how much M h e r  north 
we could go." 
One way to explain these effects is to say that the pilots in the 'automatic' 
conditions were 'overreliant' or 'overtrusting' of the system. These are rather 
shallow labels, however, and don't really provide much insight into the influence 
of the system's design on the user's cognitive processes. 
A more detailed analysis suggests that the effect of automatically 
suggesting a route is on two stages (generating options and evaluating options) in 
the planning process as modeled in Figure 10. 
............................... 
Insert Figure 10 about here 
The clearest example of this effect occurred at the point where the subjects 
had to decide whether to stay north of the storm, from DPR to RWF, or to begin 
turning south toward the destination, from DPR to FSD. (See Figure 11). It 
appears that, because the system design induced the 'sketching only' subjects to 
view the display shown in this figure if they wanted to complete a reasonable 
northern deviation: 
1. The subjects observed that the route from DPR to FSD cut close to the 
forecast storm activity; 
This observation influenced them to consider the possibility that the 2. 
forecast might be wrong and that the storm might move further 
north or east than predicted; 
onsequently chose the more con 
the behaviors of all but two of 
constraints function conditions, who viewed the 
solution at the national map level (often without even displaying the jet routes) 
and simply concluded that it looked okay without closely focusing on the choices at 
DPR. For example, while looking at the national map, Subject C4 stated 
"See if I can get the computer to find a route. (He used the route 
constraints hc t ion  with the constraints of no turbulence and no 
precipitation and the computer suggested a northerly route.) With a 
northerly deviation, I can get by with the constraints I placed on it. Now I 
want to check and make sure... (He observed the destination parameters 
for estimated time and fuel consumption.) That gives me, actually, a 
shorter flight plan and plenty of fuel at arrival. So I would go ahead and 
select that route at that point." 
Insert Figure 11 about here 
Unlike the 'sketching only' subject described earlier, there is 
considered the uncertainty associated with the storm or that he considered a more 
conservative northerly deviation. In short, rather than "explaining" the effects of 
dence that he 
splay of suggestions as "overreliance," it is more informative to 
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Initial Evaluation of System Designs. In Case 1, we can't really criticize 
either the computer's suggested route or either of the more conservative northerly 
routes selected by the pilots in the 'sketching only' version. AU of them are quite 
reasonable. We might, however, speculate that, in other circumstances, the 
cognitive processes induced by the 'sketching only' version (if these cognitive 
processes persist in other scenarios) could lead to more exploration and deeper 
consideration of the implications of uncertainty in the forecast, leading to the 
selection of a superior route. (Data relevant to this hypothesis will be presented in 
Case 3.) 
If this behavior persists in other scenarios, it might be construed as an 
advantage in the design of the 'sketching only' system. There was also evidence of 
behaviors in Case 1, however, where the 'sketching only' version put some of the 
subjects at a disadvantage. In particular, two of the 'sketching only' subjects 
selected a plan that deviated from the original plan at DBS, a second possible 
deviation point, rather than MYL, the earliest possible deviation point. This 
second deviation point is less preferable in terms of he1 consumption. 
In abstract terns, then, we again see important effects inductid by the 
system designs. The subjects in the 'route constraints and sketching' and the 
'automatic route constraints' conditions let the computer pick a he1 efficient point 
for deviation from the original plan. Because of the large solution space, however, 
the 'sketcbing only' subjects were faced with a reasonably difEcult task in 
iden- the best deviation point. 
Caw 1 Discussion - Ouervkzu. Case 1 provides clear evidence that the 
design of the system has strong effects on pilots' performances. More 
importantly, it provides insights into the ways in which design features interact 
with the characteristics of this task (scenario) to influence the user's cognitive 
processes. 
The data from Case 1 indicate that, in some ways, the use of the computer 
to produce suggested plans degrades the process of evaluating plans on the part of 
the pilots, while in other ways, (Le., finding fuel efficient solutions to avoid the bad 
weather) it enhances performance. The following cases provide M h e r  data to 
assess this apparent tradeoff between these different design concepts. 
C-2 
Case 2 was designed so that there were two initially plausible directions for 
deviating (north or south of a storm). The scenario consisted of the following: 
"It's summer and you are eight minutes into a flight from Oakland to 
Joliet. You got off the ground at 1600 Zulu. You notice that there is a solid 
line of convective thunderstorms directly in your path. Decide what you 
think the plane should do." 
For subjects in the treatment condition in which the computer automatically 
suggested a solution upon loading the case, the following two lines were added 
(prior to "Decide what you think..."): 
"The computer has suggested the orange route as an alternative to the 
original plan (the green route) based on constraints of no turbulence and no 
precipitation. You may accept either of these plans to develop another 
alternative on your own." 
F'igures 12 and 13 show the weather for this case. 
............................... 
Insert Figures 12 and 13 about here 
Subject s6: 'Sketching Only' Version. It was hypothesized, prior to  the 
experiment, that many of the subjects using the 'sketching only' version would 
explore and select a southern deviation, since the southern thunderstorm cell 
appears to be smaller than the northern cell. Because the southern cell is smaller 
than the northern cell, it seemed possible that some pilots would judge the 
southern deviation to require less distance be traversed. In order to completely 
avoid the predicted thunderstorms and turbulence, however, the deviations to the 
north and the south were nearly equidistant. Because of tail winds to the north, 
and head winds to the south, a northern deviation was clearly preferable in terms 
of fuel consumption and time of arrival. 
After looking at the current and forecast fronts and composite radar (see 
Figures 12 and 13), this subject sketched a southern deviation, compared it with 
the original route, and checked it for turbulence. This route is depicted in Figures 
12 and 13. Afhr determining that the route did not have any predicted turbulence, 
he decided to fly it. This is the only solution he sketched. 
Subject C3: 'Route Constraints and Sketching' Version. Subject C3 looked 
at the current and forecast composite radar and concluded that he could deviate 
either to  the north or the south. He decided to let the computer find a deviation 
based on constraints of light turbulence and light precipitation. The computer 
suggested the northern deviation shown in Figures 12 and 13, and the subject 
checked it for turbulence. After finding no turbulence along the deviation, he 
checked it for clearance from the thunderstorms. The subject determined that the 
distance between the route and the thunderstorms was adequate. He then decided 
to fly the computer-suggested northern route, but stated that he would keep an eye 
on the thunderstorms. 
SubjectA9: 'Automatic RouteConstrainis, Route Constrain& and 
Sketching' Version. This subject first looked at the composite radar for the 
current weather map. He compared the time and he1 consumption for the two 
routes (the original route and the automatically suggested northern route) and 
noted their differences. Finally, he gathered some more weather information, 
including winds, and decided to accept the computer-suggested northern route. 
Case 2 - Summary Statistics W e  nearly all of the 'route constraints' and 
'automatic' subjects decided to deviate north of the original route, a significant 
proportion of the 'sketching only' subjects deviated to the south, as shown in Table 
8. Based on a Chi-square test, this difference was signiscant at m.044. 
............................... 
Insert Table 8 about here 
Nevertheless, as shown in Tables 9 and 10, the 'sketching only' subjects were not 
the only ones to explore both northern and southern deviations in detail. As in 
Case 1, however, more of the 'sketching only' subjects explored alternative routes 
in detail. For Case 2, though, these differences are not statistically significant 
(a <.366). 
.............................. 
Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here 
As in Case 1, the information which the subjects looked at was also 
analyzed on the basis of treatment condition. The number of subjects in each 
condition who looked at current or forecast fkonts, current or forecast radar 
weather (composite or altitude), current or forecaet winds at altitude, and jet 
routes is presented in Table 11. 
............................... 
Insert Table 11 about here 
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Case 2 - Discussion. As stated earlier, one of our hypotheses was that, 
because of the large number of possible solutions to explore, subjects in the 
'sketching only' version would be less likely to find the most efficient route in 
terms of fuel consumption that avoided the bad weather. This effect was clearly 
shown in Case 2, where 40% of the 'sketching only' subjects selected a southern 
deviation. The various southern deviations selected used about 3% more fuel and 
took about 8 minutes longer. 
This difficulty in identeng the most fuel efficient deviation was in part 
due to a failure to access all of the data in evaluating solutions. Three of the 
subjects in the 'sketching only' version failed to look at the map display for winds, 
and consequently did not realize the southern deviation had significant 
headwinds. 
Thus, because of the large "solution space" and the large "data space," - 
subjects in the 'sketching only' version had more difficulty in generating the best 
route and in evaluating the less satisfactory southern route. In terms of the 
amount of exploration, the trend again indicated more exploration by the 
'sketching only' subjects. It is important to note, however, that: 
1. Requiring the human planner to sketch his own solution does not 
ensure that he will explore more alternatives in detail or look at all of 
the relevant data to evaluate an alternative; 
Just because the computer suggests a solution doesn't mean that the 
human planner won't explore other alternatives on his own. 
2. 
Indeed, combined with the results from Case 1, the data strongly suggest that the 
effects of the system design on exploration are very dependent on the 
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characteristics of the scenario. This result is shown even more strongly in the 
next case, where the ‘sketching onlyp subjects actually explored fewer paths. 
case3 
Case 3 was designed to present the pilots with a diflicult planning problem 
and to put thevarious system designs to a demanding test. Unlike the previous 
cases, the thunderstorms in Case 3 were not localized and their tops were not all 
at the same altitude. Like Case 2, there were two likely directions for deviating; 
but neither was without potential problems. In particular, a deviation that 
avoided storms at the beginning of the route had to pass through more severe 
storms later. Finally, flight safety was a bigger concern on this case than the 
previous cases. 
- 
Description of the Case. The following scenario was read to the subjects 
prior to their working on the cage: 
“It’s summer and you’re on a flight from Cheyenne to San Antonio. You 
got off the ground at 1900 Zulu arid are now two minutes into the flight. 
Decide what you think the plane should do.” 
For subjects in the treatment condition in which the computer automatically 
suggested a solution upon loading the case, the following two lines were added 
(prior to “Decide what you think...”): 
“The computer has suggested the orange route as an alternative to the 
original plan (the green route) based on constraints of no turbulence and no 
precipitation. You may accept either of these plans or develop your own.” 
The original route, the current aircraft position, and the current composite 
radar are shown i~ Figure 14. The current radar shows a number of 
thunderstorm cells with tops ranging from 28,000 to 43,000 feet, but the aircraft’s 
maximum altitude was 33,000 feet. One of the cells directly on the flight path had 
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a top of 43,000 feet. The forecast radar showed that the cells were predicted to 
move north and slightly east, as well as join. The winds were light and variable. 
In summary, Case 3 presented subjects with a rather complex planning 
problem. The weather was dispersed over a large area and was changing 
somewhat unpredictably. This scenario required that the pilots anticipate various 
possible outcomes and plan accordingly. 
............................ 
Insert Figure 14 about here 
The routes suggested by the computer in the ‘route constraints and sketching‘ 
and ‘automatic route constraints, route constraints, and sketching’ conditions 
are shown in Figure 15. There were two routes suggested by the computer, 
depending upon the constraints placed on it. Constraints of no turbulence and no 
precipitation caused the computer to suggest the eastern route (hereafter referred 
to as the ‘eastern’ route). Constraints that allowed light turbulence and 
precipitation caused the computer to suggest the western route (hereafter referred 
to as the ‘western’ route). In the ‘automatic route constraints, route constraints, 
and sketching‘ treatment condition, the computer automatically suggested the 
eastern route to the subjects. These subjects had to modify the constraints on the 
computer or sketch their own route in order to come up with a western route. 
Insert Figure 15 about here 
The eastern route passed between two large, severe thunderstorm cells. 
Summer thunderstorms in Texas are notorious for their volatility and it was very 
possible that the two cells on either side of the eastern route would grow and build 
together. Furthermore, the eastern route passes extremely close to a forecast 
intense cell location. 
It was hypothesized, prior to the experiment, that many of the subjects 
would have difficulty searching the space of possible solutions and that some of 
the subjects in the 'automatic route constraints' treatment condition would select 
the eastern deviation, since it was the one initially recommended by the computer, 
in spite of the fact that it is a very questionable choice in both relative and absolute 
terns. (This case was deliberately selected because the automatic suggestion 
provided by the computer was poor - poor because the computer treated the 
forecasts as reality, rather than reasoning about the uncertainty associated with 
the forecasts. The weather pattern is, however, realistic. Indeed it is based on 
real weather data provided by the National Center for Atmospheric Research.) 
Subject SI: 'Sketching Only' Version. This subject first indicated that he 
would have preferred waiting for the weather to clear. Since the plane was 
already enroute, however, he considered trying to fly above the weather. He 
rejected that possibility upon seeing the cell tops rising up to 43,000 feet. The 
subject then spent some time assessing the weather before coming up with two 
options for dealing with it. He decided to first try going all the way around the 
back side of the weather (a far western deviation), but decided against that option. 
Deciding to try a western deviation, Subject S1 first tried to deviate from TBE to 
TCC in order to avoid the cells that lay on the jet route from PUB to TCC. 
Realizing that wasn't possible, the subject tried to avoid the worst of the forecast 
cells by deviating &om PUB to LVS and then back to TCC. After completing the 
deviation to SAT, the subject compared it to the original route and determined that 
there wasn't much fuel remaining. 
Subject S1 then looked briefly at a far eastern deviation, but instead decided 
to try a far western deviation around the back of the storm again. After 
completing the deviation and checking it for turbulence, the subject decided that 
he would continue trying options, but that he would start flying a far western 
deviation. He noticed that this route had increased fuel burn, but the subject also 
noted that Albuquerque, El Paso, and Dallas were potential alternate destinations. 
The subject then raised the descent profile &om INK: to JNC in an effort to avoid 
the moderate turbulence and to conserve fuel. After comparing the altered profile 
with the original altitude profile for the deviation, he decided (based on fuel 
consumption) that he would stick with the original altitude profile. 
Finally, Subject S1 sketched another western deviation, but began from 
AMA rather than PUB. Once again, it appeared as though the subject was trying 
to avoid the forecast thunderstorm cells south of PUB. Thinking that this route 
might have saved some fuel, he compared it to the others and noted that the 
difference wasn't that large. He then reiterated his choice of a far western route. 
(Much further west than the western route shown in Figure 15.) 
Subject s6: Sketching only' Version. Subject S6 spent a fkir amount of 
time assessing the weather before deciding to deviate east fkom APA to SPS to 
DFVV (see Figure 15). Like Subject S1, he planned his deviations using forecast 
weather. In particular, he had zoomed the display around the Denver area when 
he decided to deviate east; this view clearly showed some moderate thunderstorm 
cells just south of Pueblo--these likely contributed to his decision to go east. That 
is, he eliminated possible western deviations fkom consideration based on a 
localized criterion or aspect (Kahneman, 1972). It is important to note that this 
decision was based on forecast conditions, not current conditions; current 
weather did not indicate any cells south of Pueblo. This initial decision led the 
subject to generate and select the eastern route shown in Figure 15, which passed 
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between two close, severe thunderstorms near SPS. He did not go back and 
reconsider his choice of deviation directions to find a more suitable option. 
Rather, he announced his intention to fly the eastern deviation. In the debrief, the 
subject indicated that the western deviation was clearly preferable (in spite of his 
choice of the eastern deviation when actually generating his own plan). - 
Subject c3: ltoute Constraints andSketching' Codtion. Subject C3 first - 
considered staying on the original route and picking his way between the 
thunderstorm cells. The subject made a brief inspection of the weather and then 
decided to see what the computer suggested. He selected constraints of light 
turbulence and light precipitation and the computer suggested the western 
deviation. ARer comparing the new route to the original one, the subject 
determined that the route didn't add much time and noted that the original route 
would have pawed right through the thunderstorms. He decided to take the 
western route suggested by the computer. 
Sulject CS: %uta Constraints audSketching'condition, SubjectC8 briefly 
looked at weather information before using the route constraints function with no 
turbulence and no precipitation. The computer suggested an eastern deviation 
based on those constraints. Af'ter checking the route for turbulence and then 
examining the weather some more, the subject decided to sketch a western 
deviation beginning with a leg fkom PUB to TCC. The subject completed the 
western deviation (shown in Figure 15) and checked it for turbulence. He then 
raised the altitude of the leg from INK to JCT to avoid the moderate- turbulence 
there. Next, the subject tried to find out what was causing the turbulence in the 
first place. Subject C8 looked at the destination parameters and indicated that he 
preferred the western route. He then examined the eastern deviation for 
turbulence and returned to looking at the weather. 
The subject next modified the western deviation so that it went from PUB to 
LVS before returning to TCC. At thii point he spent considerable time examining 
the two deviations he had sketched and the weather trends. He finally decided to 
fly the western deviation that he had sketched first, with the provision that it 
might have to-be modified later depending on how the weather actually developed. 
Subject A& 'Automatic Route Constraints, Route Constraints, and - - 
Sketching' Condition. Subject A9 started out by comparing the suggested eastern 
deviation with the original route (before even looking at weather information). 
After noting the differences between the routes in terms of destination parameters 
and turbulence, the subject began comparing the routes on the basis of weather. 
He then sketched a western deviation beginning at AMA and going to ROW. He 
checked the turbulence forecast for this western route and rejected it because it 
passed through an area where moderate turbulence was predicted up to 29,000 
feet for the last third of the flight. He subsequently decided to take the eastern 
deviation recommended by the computer. In the debriefing, he indicated that he 
would actually prefer the western deviation over the plan he had selected. 
- 
Case 3 - Summary Statistics. As with the previous two cases, the three 
treatment conditions were analyzed for differences in final route choices, number 
of subjects who explored multiple classes of solutions in detail, number of subjects 
who explored multiple routes in detail, and information viewed. 
Differences in Final Routes. Table 12 contrasts subjects in terms of 
whether they selected the computer-suggested eastern route. In addition, as in 
Case 2, the routes chosen by the 'sketching only' subjects were much more varied 
than the ones chosen by the subjects in the other two treatment conditions. 
.................................. 
Insert Table 12 about here 
Differences in Detailed Exploration. Case 3 stands in contrast to the 
previous two cases, in that the 'sketching only subjects did not explore multiple 
classes of solutions in detail more often than did the subjects in the other two 
groups. Instead, it was the 'automatic route constraints, route constraints, and 
sketching' group who explored multiple classes of solutions in detail more often 
than did the subjects in the other two groups (a<.022). The number of subjects 
who explored multiple classes of solutions in detail in each system design 
condition is summarized in Table 13. 
Insert Table 13 about here 
Differences in Information Search. As in the two previous cases, the 
information which the subjects looked at was analyzed on the basis of treatment 
condition. The number of subjects in each condition who looked at current or 
forecast fronts, current or forecast radar weather (composite or at altitude), 
current or forecast winds at altitude, and jet routes is presented in Table 14. 
Insert Table 14 about here 
There are no clear, statistically sisnificant differences between groups in 
information searched. The trend, however, seems to be that the 'route constraints 
and sketching' subjects looked at less idormation than the 'sketching only' and 
'automatic route' constraints, route constraints, and sketching' subjects. 
Case 3 - Discussion. Once again, the data indicate that the system design 
strongly influences the exploration and plan selection processes of the subjects. 
Search Dificulties. Some of the same challenges in searching the space of 
possible solutions that occurred in Case 2 recurred in Case 3 for subjects in the 
'sketching only' condition. For example, Subject S10 made six attempts at 
sketching routes (some were completed, some were aborted) before sketching the 
route that he finally chose. Similarly, Subject S7 made six attempts at sketching 
routes before choosing one of them. This difficulty experienced by the 'sketching 
only' subjects in generating effective plans was strikingly illustrated by one pilot 
who developed and chose a deviation all the way east around the entire storm, 
using up 24% more he1 than the more reasonable western deviation. 
Poor Search Strategies. Subject S6, described in detail earlier, illustrated a 
fascinating example of how particular strategies can lead to very poor solutions. 
His strategy can be characterized as an elimination by aspects approach 
(Kahneman, 19721, where the aspects are local decisions about which waypoint to 
go to next. 
In particular, he began by saying: Where should I go next, from PUB to 
TCC or from PUB to AMA? He selected AMA because it was krther away from 
the stonn west of TCC. He then considered: Should I go from AMA to SPS or to 
AB1 or to TCC? (See Figure 16.) He selected SPS. Because of these localized 
decisions, he neuer euen considered whether this eastern deviation was to be 
preferred globally to the western route. 
Similarly, several subjects in the automatic version exhibited ineffective 
strategies. Specifically, they first noted the computer's automatic suggestion of 
the eastern deviation (see Figure 16). They subsequently generated the western 
deviation (either by sketching it or by changing the constraints and having the 
computer generate it). They then viewed the display of predicted turbulence and 
rejected the western deviation based on the presence of moderate turbulence at 
some altitudes in the last third of the flight. They di 
alternatives, so they accepted the computer's initially s 
eastern route. 
T w o  underlying processes appear to be contributing to this poor 
performance, First, these subjects are using a single aspect or criterion to  reject 
a plan, rather than evaluating the plan globally on an absolute basis or in 
comparison to alternatives. Second, they appeared to accept the computer's initial 
suggestion by default aRer they rejected the western deviation. In particular, like 
the pilots in the automatic version in Case 1, they did not show evidence of 
considering the uncertainty associated with the weather around the eastern 
deviation. 
Disorientation. A final interesting behavior was the failure of some pilots to 
view the appropriate data when evaluating an alternative. These pilots were 
looking at the forecast weather while making decisions about the initial segment 
of the flight. They should have looked at the original weather display to guide 
decisions concerning that early in the flight. (They appeared to be unaware of 
which weather display - forecast as current weather - they were looking at.) 
Summary. In short, a number of subjects in all three conditions exhibited 
poor performance in Case 3. Although more subjects appeared to be biased 
toward a poor solution when it was suggested by the computer: 
1. This bias cannot be explained as simply due to "overreliance." These 
subjects showed clear evidence of generating and evaluating 
alternatives. Thus, much deeper explanations had to be developed to 
account for their the computer's poor stion; 
e d  by making them sketch their 
s resulted in the selection of fewer poor plans. 
Q 
Nevertheless, because of the use of an elimination by aspects strategy 
by one subject, he generated and selected the poor eastern deviation 
all by himself (without any suggestions from the computer). 
case4 
Case 4 presented subjects with a situation in which the shortest and most 
fuel-efficient deviation, north, required the pilots to violate one of their standard 
heuristics (fly upwind of thunderstorms). The storm in this case could also be 
topped, although that would have put the plane in turbulence above the storm. 
Furthermore, there was some risk of the storm growing quickly. As in the 
previous two cases, there were two likely directions for deviating; in this case 
those directions were north and south of the storm. 
The following scenario was read to the subjects prior to their working on 
the case: 
“You are on a flight from Albuquerque to New Orleans. You got off the 
ground at 1400 Zulu. You are now 19 minutes into the flight and have 
noticed a thunderstorm cell outside of Dallas. Decide what you think the 
plane should do.” 
For subjects in the treatment condition in which the computer automatically 
suggested a solution upon loading the case, the following two lines were added 
(prior to “Decide what you think...”): 
“The computer has suggested the orange route as an alternative to the 
original plan (the green route) based on constraints of no turbulence and no 
precipitation. You may accept either of these plans or develop your own.” 
The original route, the current aircrafk position, and the current composite 
radar are shown in Figure 17 along with the likely deviations north and south of 
the storm. The forecast weather showed the storm moving slowly to the 
northeast. 
............................. 
Insert Figure 17 about here 
Subject S1, Sketching only' Condition. Subject S1 began by looking at 
weather information and may have been considering flying over the top of the 
weather; he wondered aloud how high the cell went and noted that it went up to  
28,000 feet and that the plane was planned to fly at 33,000 feet. Upon noticing 
moderate turbulence, however, the subject decided to try a southern route. After 
sketching a southern deviation, he checked it for turbulence and compared it to 
the original route. The subject then reviewed the weather and the original route 
and sketched a route to the north. M e r  checking the route for turbulence, he 
decided that either route would work. Since the storm was isolated, he decided to 
take the route which consumed the least fiel, which was the northern route (even 
though the storm was moving north, as he noted). 
Subject CS, aoufe Constraints and Sketching' Condition. Subject C8 
started by checking the weather and then decided to use the route constraints 
function to find a new route based on constraints of no turbulence and no 
precipitation. The computer suggested a northern deviation which the subject 
checked for turbulence and compared with the original route. Subject C8 then 
decided to sketch a southern deviation to see if it was any better or shorter. In 
comparing the northern and southern routes, he noted the tradeoff between the 
two: the northern route took less time, but the storm was slowly moving in that 
direction. He rechecked the weather and the turbulence on the southern route 
and stated that it didn't matter which one he chose. He was continuing to look at 
the weather and the southern route when he noticed the possibility of flying above 
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the weather. This prompted him to relax his constraints to light turbulence and 
light precipitation and try the route constraints fimction again. The computer 
again suggested the northern route. The subject then went through a process of 
reasoning about the uncertainty of the forecast , the position of the aircraft relative 
to the weather, and the costs of avoiding all of the uncertainty. This resulted in 
him choosing the southern deviation so that he would be assured of avoiding the 
weather. 
Sueect A7,6AuAutomaatc Route Constraints, Route Constrain& and 
Sketching' Condition. Subject A7 first compared the destination parameters of 
the original route and the computer-suggested northern deviation. He then 
checked the deviation for turbulence and continued investigating the weather. 
Subject A7 decided to try a southern deviation and compared the destination 
parameters of that route to those of the other routes. After gathering more 
weather information, this pilot diverted to the south. 
Case 4 - Summary Statistics. Below, data for the entire 30 subjects are 
presented. 
Differences in Final Routes. For the most part, there were three reasonably 
likely route alternatives in Case 4: North of the original route, south of the 
original route, and the original route (at a higher altitude). Subjects were 
grouped on the basis of choosing a route similar to the computer-suggested 
northern deviation, a southern deviation, or the original route. This analysis is 
Table 15. In terms of fuel consumption and time of amval, the 
northern deviation is slightly better than the southern one: A southern deviation 
consumes 368 lbs. more fuel (about 2% of the fuel consumed by the northern 
On the other hand, isolated 
called 'super cells' because of their 
ects felt the tradeoff in time and 
he1 was worth t h ~  d security of a rn 
Insert Table 15 about here 
Differences in Detailed Exploration. The number of subjects who explored 
multiple classes of solutions in each system design condition is summarized in 
Table 16. Case 4 is like Case 3, in that the 'sketching onlf subjects show a trend 
to not explore multiple classes of solutions in detail as often as subjects in the 
other two groups. This trend in this direction is only very marginally significant 
(a<. 142). 
Insert Table 16 about here 
Differences in Information Search. As in previous cases, the information 
which the subjects looked at was analyzed on the basis of treatment condition. 
The number of subjects in each condition who looked at current or forecast fironts, 
current or forecast radar weather (composite or at altitude), current or forecast 
is 
differences in the groups. 
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Case 4 - Discussion. Unlike the previous cases, the data do not provide 
strong evidence that the system design strongly influenced the exploration and 
plan selection processes of the subjects, although there is a trend toward the 
‘automatic route constraints’ subjects choosing the computer’s suggested route 
more often. 
Individual Diferences. Although the data again suggest a possible (non- 
significant) biasing effect due to the computer’s automatic suggestion, the 
primary result of interest is the evidence that pilots differ in their evaluations of 
alternatives. Some clearly preferred deviating north to save time and fuel. Others 
clearly preferred the more conservative southern deviation to decrease the 
likelihood of encountering the storm. (The available data are not informative 
regarding the causes of such differences. They could be due to different mental 
models of the weather or air traffic, differences in utility functions, etc.) 
It is clear that, for the foreseeable future, it will be infeasible to fully 
automate tasks like enroute flight planning given the current state of technology. 
Feasible methods for adequately dealing with reasoning about such complex, 
uncertain events, and for considering the tradeoffs among goals like safety, cost 
and passenger comfort, simply do not exist at present. 
On the other hand, current and developing technologies seem to offer 
interesting opportunities for enhancing flight planning activities. Four areas 
seem most promising: 
1. Providing access to more complete and accurate information on 
weather, air traffic and airport  conditions in a timely fashion; 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
Designing better interfaces 
such data and information 
that allow direct manipulation of routes to explore alternatives; 
Using optimization and expert systems technologies to assist users in 
generating and evaluating alternative plans and to provide 
intelligent alerting functions; 
Using the computer to enhance communication and cooperation 
among the various people concerned with flight planning 
(dispatchers, flight crews, ATC, etc). 
Consequently, it is critical to address the question: How can advanced 
technologies be applied to develop cooperative planning systems that effectively 
support the activities of users? 
In spite of the emphasis in this paper on errors induced by FPT, overall the 
design features of all three versions supported very successfirl efforts. In Cases 1, 
2 and 4, all of the plans selected using all 3 versions of the system were quite 
acceptable, although some were less efficient in terms of fuel consumption and 
flight time. The overall efficacy of the design of F'PT as a cooperative system was 
further supported by the reactions of the pilots, such as: 
"I think it's great. It gives you another piece of information to consider. 
It's like delegating responsibility," 
"It would be great if you could sit down with your dispatcher and do this 
sort of thing before a flight." 
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"I like it. Being able to zoom in on the route and look at the weather and the 
projections is nice. It's pretty easy to use. It's pretty straightforward. It's 
got everything you need.'' 
"I wish we had something like this now, especially in operations. You'd 
have to kill guys to get them off of it." 
"I'm pretty impressed by this ...If you could get the lunch menu on here too, 
you'd have it made!" 
"Another nice thing that this gives you is the ability to create a route and 
see what the time and fuel's gonna be. The only thing on the 767, you could 
put in a different destination and see what he1 burn and time is, but you 
can't really do a whole routing. I mean, if you want to sit down and pull out 
a map and draw a course and measure it and do the whole spiel, you could, 
but that takes forever. It would be nice to have this information." 
Nevertheless, as Case 3 most dramatically demonstrated, certain design features 
can induce unacceptable performances. 
There will no doubt be a strong temptation to let technology drive the 
development of future flight planning systems because the potential value of the 
available computer and telecommunications technologies seems so apparent. 
This study, however, provides strong evidence that the design of the computer 
support system can clearly influence the exploration and evaluation of alternative 
system plans by users. The data demonstrated that, even when various 
alternative designs all provide access to the same data, some designs can exert 
powerfid, undesirable effects on the problem-solving processes of the user and on 
the final product of these processes (the selected flight amendment). 
Below we summarize the various undesirable effects observed in this study 
ss recommendations for system designs and 
Large 'Data Space$' 
In the near hture, it will be possible to provide flight planners with access 
to an incredibly rich set of data relevant to the planning process. As this study 
illustrated, however, more is not necessarily better. 
Even with the limited sources of data available to users of FFT, we saw 
evidence of: 
1. Disorientation; 
2. Failure to attend to important data. 
Such effects are likely to increase as we provide access to even more data displays. 
Some pilots, for instance, failed to recognize that they were looking only at 
the forecast weather when planning early segments of the flight (where the 
current weather displays were clearly relevant). The result for one subject (in the 
'sketching only' version) in Case 3 was to completely overlook the best solution, 
and to accept a poor flight plan. 
In addition to such "disorientation," some pilots also failed to even look at 
important data such as the winds. This was a major contributing factor leading 
to the selection of the less desirable southern deviation in Case 2 by several 
'sketching only' subjects. 
Several design principles are suggested by such data: 
1. When designing the computer system, select the data to display 
judiciously. Providing access to more kinds of data, even though they 
may all in principle be useful, does not ensure that they will be used 
effectively at the right time; 
2. Develop goo sentations to make the implications of important 
data and relationships salient to the user. (One interesting example 
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of a problem was discovered with 
informaton: A 
charts regarding the strength or directio 
Consider designing integrated data displays to co 
information pertinent to a co 
are pertinent. FPT demonstrates the integration of weather data 
with displays of alternative flight paths. Displays that integrate data 
on precipitation and turbulence at different altitudes would similarly 
be useful (but not trivial to design); 
Provide clear feedback about the state of the display (such as whether 
the displayed data represents current or forecast weather). It is not 
enough to present such data on the state of the display. It must be 
highly salient; 
Consider incorporating intelligent alerting functions to ensure that 
critical data (or the implications of these data) are not overlooked. 
er of pilots did not 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Large”So1ution Space$’ 
Because of the large number of possible flight paths, the subjects in the 
‘sketching only’ version sometimes had difficulty finding a good alternative. In 
circumstances where time is critical, such difIidties could also use up valuable 
time and attention. 
This problem suggests the potential value of tools (based on optimization or  
expert system 
such tools, the subjects frequently found solutions that used up significantly more 
flight time and fuel and were no better in terms of other criteria. One subject, for 
instance, selected a plan in Case 3 that used up 24% more fuel. 
ologies) to help search for good solutions. Indeed, without 
rgument to utilizing such technologies is that they are brittle. 
They may be good for routine situations that the designer has anticipated but they 
also fail unacceptably in unanticipated situations. Such a line of argument 
continues by suggesting that we keepthe person "in the loop" by making him do 
more of the work, and by suggesting that, because he must therefore stay 
involved, he wil l  notice and deal with unusual situations. In short, this 
argument suggests that, although people won't always find the best solution, by 
keeping them involved we will avoid bad solutions. Clearly, the extreme form of 
this argument is a "straw man." People make errors too. Consequently, we must 
somehow weigh the tradeoffs between the potential errors made by the designer 
(including those for situations that we don't know about, since otherwise the 
designer could design for them!) and errors made by users, and to design 
assuming both the designers and users are fallible. 
- - 
- 
Case 3 provided a nice illustration of the fact that keeping the person "in the 
loop" doesn't ensure that poor solutions wi l l  be avoided One of the 'sketching 
only' subjects generated and selected the poor eastern route on his own. Thus, a 
principle like "avoid excessive automation in order to keep the person involved in 
the task" is too simplistic. Keeping the person invohed does not ensure more 
exploration, nor does it ensure solutions will be chosen that are at least 
satisfactory. Instead, we must consider how specific types of designs will interact 
with.users' cognitive processes in specific types of scenarios to produce 
undesirable behaviors. (The discussions of results for Cases 1 and 3 provide 
illustrations of such cognitive models.) In terms of this application area, what 
we need is a design that lets the computer use its power to help search the 
solution space, while keeping the person involved and while protecting against 
errors the person may make. The first two problems might be addressed by 
either: 
1. Developings ticated perceptual displays that make alternatives 
easier to generate and evaluate. (One possibility would be a display 
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that allowed the user to p 
setting constraints (e.g., telling the eo 
routes on the map that pass through more than light turbulence); 
Using optimization or expert systems technologies to let the computer 
generate alternatives (which is what FPT does using the route 
constraints tool), but improving the design by having the computer 
generate the best alternative(s) for each class of solutions, and then 
letting the user evaluate these alternatives. Thus, the computer 
might display the 'best" deviations both north and south of a storm 
for comparison by the user. 
2. 
We speculate that both of these potential solutions would keep that person involved 
because he would have to look at the data to make choices among alternatives. 
A solution to  the third problem is more complicated, though, as we need to 
first predict the nature of the errors the person might make. This is discussed 
further below. 
As pointed out above, system users sometimes develop poor plans even 
when they are kept "in the loop." (Case 3 illustrated this behavior.) On the other 
hand, because of the limitations and brittleness of the technology used in FPT, the 
route constraints b c t i o n  also produced a poor suggestion in Case 3. ("his 
resulted b r n  the fact that FPT does not reason about the uncertainty associated 
with forecasts.) O w  study illustrated that, even though subjects in the automatic 
suggestion version used the available "manual" functions to explore alternatives 
to the computer's suggestion, 40% still wound up accepting this poor plan. 
Two points are worth emphasizing based on this resulk 
The 
be quite pronounced. S 
utomatic suggestions by the computer can 
in Cases 1 and 3 who were presented 
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with the computer's suggestion clearly reasoned less (or not at all) 
about the uncertai 
accept a poor flight plan in Case 3; 
These effects cannot be explained by a simple label like 
"overreliance." The design of the computer influences users in a 
complex, scenario-specific fashion. (The discussions of the results 
for Cases 1 and 3 present cognitive models of such effects.) Thus, to 
evaluate proposed support tools, scenario-sensitive cognitive models 
need to be considered. 
associated with the forecast, leading them to 
2. 
This failure by subjects to reason about uncertainty when viewing the computer's 
suggestion might be alleviated by either of the two solutions outlined above. Just 
as using the 'sketching only' version induced subjects to look at critical data, 
causing them to ask the question "which path is better if the forecast is wrong," 
requiring subjects to choose from among several alternatives suggested by the 
computer might induce them to look at the critical data and ask the same 
question. 
A further form of protection against such failures to consider uncertainty 
would be the incorporation of an intelligent alerting Eunction that either: 
1. Warned the person when a route might be "too close" to a developing 
problem; 
Inhibited the display of a suggested route by the computer if it 
appeared to be "too close'' to a developing problem (thus making the 
computer very conservative in suggesting alternatives). 
or 2. 
C ;e caution is in order regarding these potential solutions, however. Subjects 
may fixate on the alternative solutions suggested by the computer and 
consequently fail to note an even be 
note that the computer has suggested a poor solutio 
on that the computer missed or fail to 
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lMaladaptivestrategiw 
The literature on human problem-so s numerous examples of 
how, in order to reduce the complexity of a decision, people apply simplifying 
heuristics (Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka, 1978). One such strategy is to 
eliminate an alternative based on a single criterion, rather than evaluating the 
alternative more globally ( in terms of all of the relevant criteria). In Case 3, this 
type of strategy was exhibited by subjects using all three versions of the system. 
The result was the selection of a poor plan by 10% of the subjects in the 'sketching 
only' version, 30% of the subjects in the 'sketching and route constraints' version 
and 40% of the subjects in the automatic suggestion version. 
Having the computer indicate several possible solutions might help 
encourage a more global evaluation. In addition, it niight be helpfid to use 
animation to create displays to help the user view the data over the entire flight, 
and to include redundancy in the evaluation of plans (e.g., letting the flight crew 
look at displays of paths proposed by a dispatcher or vice versa). 
Supporting IndividualDijTemncxs 
Finally, results like those in Case 4 provide strong evidence for the need to 
give the person the option to explore alternatives on their own. Because people 
m e r  in terms of their preferences and mental models of a situation, and because 
we have no objective way to say who is "right" for each such situation, we need to 
give people the tools necessary to allow them to create their own alternatives and 
to play "what if' games, even if the computer provides some suggestions. 
FinalNote 
This study demonstrates that the design of an effective cooperative system 
for a complex task like flight planning is a significant challenge. It requires 
careful consideration of how system design features influence the cognitive 
processes of users in specific types of scenarios. VVhile there are important 
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directions for further research, the results highlight a number of considerations 
for designers of flight planning systems to support dispatchers and flight crews in 
particular, and as well as for designers of cooperative problem-solving systems in 
general. 
Are such considerations worth the effort? The ability of a system design to 
induce 40% of the pilots to select a poor flight plan suggests that there is indeed a 
very real need to explore these issues further and to take them seriously when 
implementing commercial systems. 
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1. boiling water; 
2. kitchen; 
3. coffee-ban store; 
4. grinder store; 
6. coffee grinder; 
7. brewed-coffee store; 
8. bank 
9. money. 
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make coffee 
be in kitchen 
buy something 
go somewhere 
get money 
boil water 
be at store 
have money 
have something 
place exists be at place 
be at bank have money 
not at any other place 
be in the kitchen have boiling water 
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Precondition Initial criticality 
place exists 
have something 
be somewhere 
3 
2 
1 
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Precondition Criticality 
bean store exists 5 
brewed-coffee store exists 5 
bank exists 5 
kitchen exists 5 
have grinder 4 
have beans, boiling water, money 2 
be at brewed coffe store, bean store, bank 1 
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Sketching 
Constraints 
Auto 
Table 5. Number of classes of solutions explored in Case 1. 
tr of Subjects 
Who Explored Who Explored 
Multiple A Single 
Classes Class 
4 6 
0 10 
0 10 
# of Subjects 
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Sketching 
Constraints 
Auto 
Table 6. N u m k  of specific mutes explored in Case 1, 
# of Subjects 
Who Explored Who Explored 
Multiple A Single 
Routes Route 
6 4 
1 9 
1 9 
# of Subjects 
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Table 7. Information search performance in Case 1. 
Fronts Radar Winds Jet Routes 
Sketch 9 9 7 10 
Constraints a 10 5 9 
Auto 9 9 6 5 
Table& RoutesselectedinCase2. 
North South Radar 
Sketch 6 4 10 
Constraints 9 1 lo 
Auto lo 0 lo 
Table 9. Number ofclasses of solutions explored in Case 2. 
# of Subjects 
Who Explored 'who Explored 
Multiple A Single 
Classes Class 
# of Subjects 
Sketching 
Constraints 
Auto 
8 
5 
4 
2 
5 
6 
Sket cbing 
Constraints 
Auto 
Table 10. Number of specific mutes explored in Case 2. 
# of Subjects 
Who Explored Who Explored 
Multiple A Single 
Routes Route 
8 2 
6 4 
5 5 
# of Subjects 
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Table 11. Case 2 information s e d  characbhtiw. 
Fronts Radar Winds Jet Routes 
Sketch 7 10 7 10 
Constraints 7 lo 3 9 
Auto 8 9 7 8 
Sketch 
Constraints 
Auto 
Table 12. Final mute choices for Case 3. 
Computer- Sugge s t ed 
Eastern Route Other 
1 
3 
4 
9 
7 
6 
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Sketching 
Constraints 
Auto 
Tatble 1% Number of solution classes explored in Case 3. 
# of Subjects 
Who Explored Who Explored 
Multiple A Single 
Classes Class 
5 5 
3 7 
9 1 
# of Subjects 
94 
Table 14. I&ormation search in Case 3. 
Fronts Radar Winds Jet Routes 
Sketch lo lo 5 10 
Constraints 6 lo 1 7 
Auto 8 lo 5 9 
Sketch 
Constraints 
Auto 
Table 15. Final route choices for Case 4. 
North South Original 
5 4 1 
5 4 1 
7 2 1 
Sketching 
Constraints 
Auto 
Tabk 16. Number of solution classes exploxed in Case 4 
# of Subjects 
Who Explored Who Explored 
Multiple A Single 
Classes Class 
# of Subjects 
6 4 
5 5 
9 1 
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Sketch 
Constraints 
Auto 
Table 17. Inforrmation search cbmaddstics for Case 4. 
Fronts Radar Winds 
8 10 6 10 
7 lo 4 8 
6 u) 4 9 
List of Fieurea 
Figure 1. 
Figure 2. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 4. 
Figure 5. 
Figure 6. 
Figure 7. 
Figure 8. 
Figure 9. 
Figure 10. 
Figure 11. 
Figure 12. 
Figure 13. 
Figure 14. 
Figure 15. 
Figure 16; 
Figure 17. 
Partial set of factors releyant. to enroute flight planning. 
A hierarchical plan for hammering nails. (after Miller, Galanter’and Pribram, 1960, 
p. 36). 
After Wilensky, 1983, p. 23. 
Left monitor with weather menu. 
Left monitor with route constraints menu. 
High altitude jet routes and waypoints. - 
Right monitor. 
Situation at the start of Case 1. 
Routes explored by sample subjects in Case 1. 
A model of the plan adaptation cycle. 
Fuel-efficient, computer suggested route vs. more conservative northern deviations. 
Routes explored by sample subjects in Case 2 (plotted on a map showing the initial 
weather). 
Routes explored by sample subjects in Case 2 (plotted on a map showing the 
forecast weather). 
Original route and current composite radar for Case 3. 
Computer suggested routes for Case 3. 
Routes considered by the ‘sketching only’ subjects in Case 3. 
Current composite radar for Case 4. 
(location, altitude, heading, speed, 
fuel, weight, communication 
capabilities, equipment status, and 
capabilities) 
\ 
I I 
1 
(location, altitude, heading, 
speed, fuel, weight, 
equipment status, and 
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